The tricky Constitutional Reforms

North Africa is not a homogenous bloc of Arab societies, struggling in unison for one pan-Arab cause.

U.S. media coverage of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt has largely ignored the mass movement of North Africa's ethnic minorities.

But Moroccan Berbers that are 30% of the total population have been on the streets all along, protesting in what they are calling a new Printemps Amazigh or Berber Spring, not to be confused with its Arab counterpart.

Moroccans voted on constitutional reforms today at some 40,000 polling stations across the nation. There is little doubt that the vote will come out in favor of Moroccan King Mohamed VI's gestures toward change.

Among the reforms, the constitutional review will raise the Berber language or Tamzight to official language status, meaning that it will now be taught in Moroccan schools in addition to Modern Standard Arabic.

But the nation's Berbers say the gesture won't help their political marginalization by what they believe is an Arab-dominated government.

"This is a symbolic measure. But there are still those in government who have long worked against the integration of Amazighs (the Berber word for Berber) politically and these measures won't do much about them," said Ahmed Adghirni, the front man for the Berber struggle in Morocco, in a phone interview from Rabat, Morocco's capital.

Adghirni started the Parti Démocratique Amazigh Marocain (PDAM), a political party to represent Moroccan Berbers in 2005, although his gestures to represent Berbers politically started in 1993.

The party was banned in 2007 and formally dissolved by Morocco's judiciary in 2008, on the grounds that race-based parties are illegal in the North African nation. Shortly after, the party reunited under the name Parti Ecologiste Marocain, but remains virtually inactive in Moroccan government.

"The activists in my party are trying to safeguard our rights. We are deprived of participation in Moroccan politics. We are looking for a favorable political climate to continue with our activities," said Adghirni.

Although they are largely unimpressed by the constitutional changes, Berber activists expect some improvement in their integration into mainstream Moroccan society.

"There are some Berber people in the Atlas mountains that come to live in the cities, but they can't make it in Moroccan cities, because they can't speak [Arabic]. Now the Arabs in Morocco need to learn Berber as they do Arabic," said Slimane, a 23-year-old Berber activist and documentarian in Marrakech, who declined to publish his full name out of fear of retribution from the anti-Berber Arab Islamists who have threatened Ahmed Adghirni's life on several occasions.

Both Slimane and Adghirni are practicing Muslims.

Despite the indisputable benefits, Slimane says that an official Berber language won't change popular Moroccan Arab attitudes towards Berbers.

"The Berbers are the ice cream in society -- not taken seriously, but a kind of novelty," he said, explaining that while Berber culture is sold to international tourists in jewelry and couscous platters, Morocco has made no gestures to ensure their political representation.

Berbers consider themselves the indigenous people of North Africa and predate the Arab conquest of North Africa. Berber populations stretch from Morocco to Egypt and as far into Sub-Saharan Africa as Nigeria.

Official Moroccan figures say Berbers make up 40 percent of the nation's population, but analysts say the number ranges from 60 to 70 percent. Berber activists say that Moroccan government statistics attempt to downplay the number of Berbers in the country to maintain an Arab majority.

Unlike Slimane, some Berber activists are outraged by the gesture to quiet Berber activists with what they call a token change in the Moroccan constitution.

"This is a trick to calm Berber organizations," said Hassan from East Morocco. Although the Berber's movement for integration and respect in Moroccan society has long outrun the recent Arab spring, the Jasmine Revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt provoked a series of protests this year, calling for democracy, and more specifically, political representation of Morocco's majority-cum-minority.

Hassan said that Berber activists are not convinced by the king's gesture toward change.

"Morocco is a Berber country," he said, "not Arab."

"This is only the beginning of the Berber fight. There won't be any respect for us unless we are represented in government."

Berber militants like Hassan are calling for self-rule.

"There won't be any more legitimacy [in the current government] unless it's run under a Berber system."

But Adghirni, the Berber political representative, has been weathered by death threats from pan-Arabist Islamist organizations.

"Sometimes I think about leaving Morocco, because my personal life and my rights are constantly menaced," said Adghirni.

"But I have a duty to my people -- The Berber activists and everyday people. I'm obliged to stand by them."

Moroccan voters set to back king's new constitution

New constitution the monarch's response to demands for greater freedoms resulting from the Middle East unrest

Moroccans voted on Friday on whether to adopt a new constitution that the king has championed as an answer to demands for greater freedoms – but that protesters say will still leave the monarch firmly in control.

The referendum on the constitution is near certain to result in a resounding yes vote, like all past referendums in this North African country and generally throughout the Arab world.

It is buoyed by a huge media and government campaign, and is seen by some as a way to tentatively open up Moroccan politics, while heading off the kind of tumultuous regime change seen elsewhere in the region.

Some voters at the country's nearly 40,000 polling stations described the ballot as a vote of confidence in King Mohammed VI, a 47-year-old who assumed the throne in 1999 and is seen as a relatively modern monarch.

Preliminary results are expected after polls close Friday night.

A popular tourist destination, the generally stable, Muslim kingdom is a staunch US ally in a strategic swath of northern Africa that has suffered terrorist attacks – and in recent months, popular uprisings against autocratic regimes.

Morocco, like the rest of the Middle East, was swept by pro-democracy demonstrations at the beginning of the year, protesting a lack of freedoms, weak economy and political corruption.

The king, however, seems to have managed the popular disaffection by presenting a new constitution that guarantees the rights of women and minorities, and increases the powers of the parliament and judiciary, ostensibly at the expense of his own.

Protests have continued nevertheless, and the 20 February pro-democracy movement has called for a boycott. It insists that the new constitution leaves the king firmly in power and will be little different from its predecessor.

Their voices have been drowned out as nearly every political party, newspaper and television station has for the past several weeks pressed for Moroccans to vote in favour of the constitution.

The monarch was among those voting, casting his ballot in a chic Rabat neighbourhood and, like every other voter, his voting card and ID were checked against the list. He voted with his brother, Prince Moulay Rachid.

Crowds were small but steady at voting stations in a working class neighbourhood of Sale, outside the capital, Rabat.

Voters were given two pieces of paper – one for a yes vote and one for a no vote – and placed one in an envelope which they put into the urn. The yes ballot was white, and the no ballot light blue, so that illiterate voters could participate.

In the Moroccan countryside, voter turnout was stronger in the morning, before a searing heat descended. Officials at different voting stations said turnout was around 25% to 35% by late morning.

Cafile Roqiya, a 54-year-old in glasses and a headscarf in the town of Benslimane, said she was voting yes "because there has been much progress". "It is much better than before. The king keeps us stable and at peace amidst much upheaval," she said.

On the eve of the referendum, a pro-democracy demonstration of a few hundred people was swamped by thousands of government supporters who had been bussed in for the occasion wearing matching T-shirts supporting the constitution.

The activists had to take refuge in a gas station under the protection of police while they were hounded by raucous pro-government demonstrators who threw eggs at them and called them "traitors" and "agents".

During the weekly prayers on 24 June, imams in the mosque read out sermons issued by the government urging Moroccans to vote yes as an act of faith.

In cities around the country, banners paid for by local merchants exhort people to come out and vote, a practice seen throughout the Arab world when governments call a referendum and local businessmen want to stay in the good graces of officialdom.

Most observers agree that the real signs of change for Morocco will come with how the new constitution is implemented.

"We say yes to the constitution, but how it turns out in practice, well that's another struggle," said Saadeddin al-Othmani, a top official in the Islamist Development and Justice party, which like most political parties supports the new constitution.

Al-Othmani sees it as a beginning of reform and Morocco's own way of responding to the Arab Spring – not by toppling their leader or repressing the people, but through gradual measures.

The February 20 movement, and the groups that support it, including smaller labour unions, leftist parties and the country's banned Justice and Charity Islamist movement, lack al-Othmani's faith in the process.

They see the king's 9 March speech and three-month consultation period before the new constitution was presented 17 June as the latest in a long line of cosmetic touches to an absolute monarchy.

"We want to liberate the country from the state's monopoly on politics and economy," said Mohammed Lekrari, a leader of the Democratic Confederation of Labour, a union representing around 800,000 public sector workers. "We would like to leave the Middle Ages."

There is a whiff of medieval in the frenzied hype around the need for a yes vote, says his colleague Othmane Baqa, because a vote for a constitution is being seen as a vote for the king – like the oath of allegiance, the "baya," given to Muslim kings for hundreds of years and still practiced annually in Morocco.

"They want this baya through the referendum, so all Morocco must swear allegiance," he said. "It becomes a vote for unity and the king."

Facts about Morocco that holds reform referendum

Here are some facts about Morocco which is holding a referendum on constitutional reform on Friday.

THE ECONOMY:

·        Morocco expected GDP growth of 5 percent in 2011, its planning commission minister said this month.

·        The growth is supported by the strong agriculture sector. The economy relies heavily on agriculture, whose fate depends on rainfall levels that can be erratic.

·        Inflation for 2011 will be 1.4 percent, according to the central bank.

·        Morocco's grain harvest this season is seen at 7.8 million tonnes, slightly up on last year's figure but below the Agriculture Ministry's estimate of 8.8 million tonnes.

In response to the protests around the country, Rabat boosted subsidies for items such as wheat, sugar, gas and oil by 15 billion dirhams ($1.84 billion) in addition to the to the 17 billion dirhams already allocated in the 2011 budget.

DETAILS:

GDP (2010): $103.5 billion.

Per capita GDP (PPP, 2010): $4,800.

Labour force (2010) 11.63 million

Life expectancy at birth: 71.8

COUNTRY DETAILS:

• POPULATION: 32 million. The population of disputed territory Western Sahara is around 385,000.
• ETHNIC GROUPS: Arab 70 percent, Berber 30 percent.
• RELIGION: Mainly Sunni Muslim (99 percent). There are Christian and Jewish minorities.
• LANGUAGE: Most people speak Darija, a mixture of Arabic, European and Berber languages. Arabic is the country's official language. Berber languages are spoken in mountainous areas and the south and many Moroccans also speak French or Spanish.
• AREA: 446,550 sq km (172,414 sq miles), bordering the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Algeria lies to the east and to the southwest lies Western Sahara, a disputed territory which the Rabat government says is part of Morocco.

Sources: Reuters/CIA/State Dept/UNDP/MENA Today

Gap Coming To Morocco, Egypt

The Gap Inc. (NYSE:GPS), as part of its expansion project in the $1.4 trillion global apparel market, has taken a maiden step to bring its brand to Africa. The company is expected to unveil the latest trend in Egypt and Morocco in July and October, respectively.

The company has plans to open a Gap store in Egypt while The Gap and Banana Republic stores in Morocco. Only last year, The Gap had taken an initiative to sell its products in Egypt, Morocco and South Africa via its international online shipping provider.

Through contracts with its existing franchise — The Fawaz Al Hokair Group — Gap expects to introduce its first store in Egypt in the Mall of Arabia, located in the capital city of Cairo. The company also plans to open two more Gap stores in Cairo’s City Stars Mall and Sun City Mall in October.

In Morocco, the company expects to open its first Gap and Banana Republic stores in Casablanca. Morocco has a flourishing retail market and a growing urban population, an advantage that the company would like to cash in on in its efforts to spur growth. The Gap through a new franchise agreement with Aksal Group will first make its products available to Moroccan customers in the city’s new Morocco Mall.

The leading global specialty retailer has lately consolidated its foreign business under one division from London. The rationalized division, which is headed by Stephen Sunnucks, is responsible for all company-operated and franchised stores across Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, Asia Pacific and South America.

The Gap currently has expanded its franchise store base to more than 180 and stretched out its footprint from 2 to 29 countries which includes Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, Australia, Chile, Serbia and now Africa. The company expects to increase its franchised store base to 400 by 2014.

Based in San Francisco, California, The Gap Inc. is a premier international specialty retailer offering a diverse range of clothing, accessories and personal care products for men, women, children and babies. Its flagship brands include Gap, Banana Republic, Old Navy, Piperlime and Athleta.

However, The Gap operates in a highly fragmented market and competes with well-established rivals like American Eagle Outfitters Inc. (NYSE:AEO) and The TJX Companies Inc. (NYSE:TJX).

The Gap’s shares maintain a Zacks #4 Rank, which translates into a short-term Sell rating. Our long-term recommendation on the stock remains Neutral.

MoneyGram International and Al Barid Bank Align to Offer Money Transfer Services in Morocco

CASABLANCA, Jun 29, 2011  -- MoneyGram International MGI -0.54%  , a leading global money transfer company, and Al Barid Bank, banking subsidiary of Morocco Post, announced today the achievement of their partnership, adding 1,800 locations in Morocco. With this alliance, new agent Al Barid Bank becomes MoneyGram's largest agent in the country. MoneyGram's service is currently being rolled out by region with all locations to be active by the end of August. With the addition of these branches, MoneyGram will count more than 5,000 agent locations in Morocco.

"We are very pleased that Al Barid Bank has decided to offer MoneyGram's service, this is a significant business opportunity and an excellent alliance for MoneyGram," stated Francois Peyret, regional director for MoneyGram International. "Morocco is a growth market for MoneyGram as it ranks in the top remittance countries in the world. As we continue to add top agents such as Al Barid Bank to our network we are able to better increase our market share in the country and provide a valuable service to thousands of citizens."

"Offering MoneyGram's service further demonstrates Al Barid Bank's commitment to providing a diversified mix of products and services in order to meet our customer needs. This new partnership will allow Al Barid Bank to strengthen its current money transfer offerings," said M. Redouane Najm-Eddine, president and director of Al Barid Bank. "MoneyGram is a respected brand in Morocco and we know our customers will find value in using the service to easily and quickly receive funds from family working abroad."

MoneyGram has been in Morocco since 1998 and recently opened an office in Casablanca dedicated to taking care of its 10 agent partners in Morocco and those in North Africa and West Francophone Africa as well as ensuring a great product for the customer across the region.

According to the World Bank, more than $6.4 billion was sent to Morocco in 2010, making it number 18 in the top 20 remittance receive countries. Countries that send the most money to Morocco include Spain, Italy, the United States, France, Canada, Germany and Saudi Arabia.

About Al Barid Bank

Created on June 8th, 2010, Al Barid Bank is the banking subsidiary of the Morocco Post. Thanks to a recognized know-how and to a network of 1800 locations covering the whole territory, Al Barid Bank offers its services for the largest number, including in the most rural villages. By offering a service of proximity, at adapted price, Al Barid Bank accompanies the banking of Morocco, according to the mission which is assigned to them. Since the creation of Al Barid Bank, the rate of banking has raised from 34% to 47%.

To learn more, please visit www.albaridbank.ma .

The tricky question: Vote YES or NO to the new Moroccan Constitution

Keen observers of Morocco have long argued that the gradual democratization of the rules of the political game will not materialize without bottom-up pressure from ordinary Moroccans. It is public outrage over corruption and political systems oriented around power and privilege that have served everywhere as a catalyst for systemic change. Despite the popularity of the monarchy in Morocco, there has been a growing mismatch between the public’s aspirations for development and democracy and ruling elites’ insistence that the existing institutional architecture is needed to accommodate gradual reforms while maintaining stability.

In the absence of a credible opposition willing to challenge the monarchy’s prerogatives, it seemed only a severe crisis of governance or external shock could force democratic change onto the policy agenda. That moment finally came with the stunning overthrow of the strongmen of neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt. Those dramatic events gave birth to the February 20 protest movement. Despite its relative failure to mobilize large numbers of Moroccans, the protesters—a loose coalition of leftists, liberals and Islamists—injected a new nervousness in the corridors of power. The monarchy quickly grasped that the strength of the leaderless movement did not come from its numbers but from the legitimacy of their demands.

King Mohammed VI’s March 9 speech, in which he outlined parameters for constitutional change, was a direct reaction to the rise of new opposition forces. In an attempt to seize the initiative, he promised wide-ranging reforms, including an elected government and independent judiciary. He announced the formation of an ad-hoc committee entrusted with revising the constitution. The king’s preemptive moves, coming so quickly after the initial protests, helped in stealing some of the opposition’s momentum.

Indeed, the last two months have seen the February 20 movement lose some steam, limiting its ability to reach the levels of popular mobilization seen in Egypt, Yemen or Bahrain. In addition, public perception of the protesters has shifted as the movement struggles to articulate a workable vision for political change while shaking off suspicions it has been hijacked by radical Islamist forces. The horrendous terrorist attack in Marrakesh on April 28—in which 17 were killed—only intensified the uncertainty surrounding the movement and heightened anxiety that social and political agitation could end up benefiting violent Salafi movements.

These fears accentuated with the revolts of Salafi prisoners in May and the hardening of the February 20 demands, as reflected in their calls for cancelling the king’s popular Mawazine Festival (featuring Shakira) and direct attacks on Morocco’s notorious intelligence services (DST) for running secret detention facilities. The protesters’ targeting of the DST came at an inopportune moment, as the agency’s reputation for effectiveness was boosted with its swift arrests of the perpetrators of the Marrakesh attack. The February 20 refusal to back down elicited a violent response from the state’s security services, leading to demonstrations on May 29 in which dozens injured and one killed—the pro-democracy movement’s first “martyr.”

With King Mohammed’s June 17 speech outlining long-awaited constitutional revisions, February 20 finds itself at a difficult crossroads, trying—and struggling—to devise a response to one of the few Arab regimes that has demonstrated a flexible and apparently effective approach to the Arab revolts. Its lack of charismatic leadership and raucous decision-making process have also given the impression of a movement lacking in organizational discipline and riddled with ideological contradictions.

On the eve of the king’s speech, the balance of power between the regime and the protesters had clearly changed from the early months of 2011. In a move that kept labour unions and other syndicates off the streets, the government doubled subsidies, raised public sector salaries, increased minimum wage, recruited 4,300 graduates in the public sector, and cancelled farmers’ debt. Unlike the zero-sum political games of other Arab states facing turmoil, the Moroccan regime skillfully portrayed the promise of top-down reform as a win-win compromise between the old authoritarian constitution and the parliamentary monarchy model demonstrators have been calling for.

The new constitution provides for an “elected” prime minister drawn from the ranks of the largest party in parliament. With the king’s consent, he has the authority to appoint and fire ministers as well as dissolve parliament. Under the proposed reforms, parliament—which had long been relatively weak—now has the potential to play a more assertive role. The exercise of parliamentary oversight of the executive branch is strengthened by lowering the threshold for launching investigations (just one-fifth of its members) and introducing a censure motion against cabinet ministers (one-third). The new constitution also sets into motion a decentralization process, whereby more power is devolved to elected regional councils. On the flip side, the constitution maintains the king’s dominant position in Moroccan politics. He remains the country’s supreme religious and military authority. In matters of security—it is up to the king to decide what exactly that means—he, rather than the prime minister, will have the authority to convene the cabinet. In other words, the king will continue to have veto power over all major decisions.

Despite its failure to significantly limit the king’s powers, the new constitution provides a margin of political maneuverability that did not previously exist. The key question, then, is whether Morocco’s established political parties will use it. The success of the king’s reforms—thus far unrealized—will depend on the ability, or more likely the willingness, of parties and civil society organizations to maintain pressure on the monarchy and push the envelope further. Here, there is little reason to be optimistic. The parties’ responses to the king’s original March 9 speech were disappointing, as evidenced in their timid proposals for constitutional reform.

With few exceptions, none of the parties dared discuss the provisions outlining the king’s religious (article 19), “sacred” (article 23), and legislative (article 29) powers. Even the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), arguably the country’s only credible opposition actor, adhered strictly to the framework that the king laid out in his two major speeches. It should come as no surprise, then, that the political class assured the public that the proposed constitution exceeded their demands and expectations.

It is perhaps unrealistic—and at odds with much of political history—to expect King Mohammed, however benevolent, to voluntarily diminish his own relevance as monarch. Certainly, he can be blamed for falling short of February 20’s expectations, but the legal opposition, including Islamists and leftists alike, bears responsibility for failing to push harder. Of course, it is difficult to determine the origins of the problem. Political parties, after all, were legalized and allowed to participate in elections because they accepted the king’s legitimacy and prerogatives. They operate in an environment where speech criticizing the king—who the constitution considers “inviolable”—is criminalized.

Many Moroccans hold out hope that the youth wings of the established parties succeed in challenging (and perhaps dislodging) their compromised leadership of patronage-driven elites and politicians. Whatever its tangible successes or failures, the effects of the February 20 movement are undeniable. The movement has helped bring to the fore a new dynamic of young political activists mobilizing against entrenched power structures and calling for greater democracy and representation not just in Morocco as a whole but also within the political parties and organizations of which they are a part.

There is now, then, an unprecedented opportunity for both sides. The new constitution empowers the parliament and the political parties to play a more assertive role—if they choose to play it. The threat of revolt and instability—as well as their own indigenous protest movement—give them bargaining power vis-à-vis the king. Importantly, the constitution’s provisions also allow the king to use his unlimited prerogative to block real changes. What he does, and chooses not to do, is critical. As unlikely as it now seems, the best-case scenario is that the king follows the spirit rather than the letter of the new constitution, respects the will of his people, and resists the urge to intervene in affairs of the elected government. Constitutions matter, but what matters more is what people do with them.

This is where Morocco’s friends in the West come in. The time for prioritizing economic liberalization at the expense of democratic reform is over. While Morocco may be more “progressive” than most its neighbours, it is still a state that relies on political restrictions and repression, albeit with a subtler touch. The United States and the European Union should stop heaping praise on Morocco for being a model of reform it hasn’t yet become. American and EU policy must be re-oriented to focus on a number of critical priorities: freedom of association and speech, constraining the powers of the king and the makhzen (royal court), and strengthening the role of elected institutions, such as parliament. Meanwhile, economic aid, as the new European Neighbourhood Policy states, must be linked to the idea of “more for more” with “precise benchmarks and a clearer sequencing of actions.”

King Mohamed has declared his commitment to substantive reform and democratization. It is only fair that the United States and Europe hold him to his own promises. The stakes are considerable. If constitutional reforms lead to separation of powers, independence of the legislature and judiciary, and a monarchy that removes itself from day-to-day rule, the regional implications could indeed be significant. Then—and only then—should Morocco be considered a “model.”

Doomed Press in Morocco

Protestors in Rabat, Morocco call for the release of Rachid Nini at a demonstration on Jun 16, 2011.

Some Moroccans love him; others loathe him. But they all read Rachid Nini, until recently the editor, publisher, and star columnist of Al-Massae, Morocco’s largest newspaper.
In June, Nini became an unlikely free-speech martyr when he was convicted of being a “threat to national security” and sentenced to a year in prison. The story of Nini’s phenomenal rise and fall began in 1997. Then an unremarkable freelance columnist for the center-right newspaper Al-Alam, Nini traveled to the Canary Islands for a cultural conference and decided to remain illegally in Spain. For three years, he worked odd jobs in different cities and, upon his return to Morocco in 2000, published a wildly successful memoir of his life, Diary of an Illegal. He also joined the staff at Assabah, writing a column that became so popular that enterprising street vendors photocopied it to sell it separately. In 2006, buoyed by this success, Nini launched Al-Massae, a newspaper that very quickly outsold all others in the country.

The key to Nini’s popularity is his style, which combines the simplicity of Glenn Beck, the combativeness of Bill O’Reilly, and the humor of Dennis Miller. In his column, “Shouf Tshouf,” he mixes standard and colloquial Arabic, making him accessible to most Moroccans. His sarcasm is aimed at corrupt politicians and greedy officials, but also at liberals, feminists, Jews, homosexuals, and other real or imagined dangers to the nation.
Nini’s columns are often full of hate, but swaddled in piety and nationalism. He has said that Abdellah Taia, a prominent novelist who is gay, shouldn’t have been interviewed on state-sponsored TV; he has accused his rival Ahmed Reda Benchemsi, editor of the magazine TelQuel, of “mocking God and his prophet” for daring to publish a collection of jokes about Islam. And two years ago, Nini pointed the finger at Jean-Louis Servan Schreiber, a Jewish shareholder in Benchemsi’s magazine, suggesting that Schreiber was responsible for its liberal editorial line. Nini’s populist columns earned him the wrath of many, but he remained popular with large sections of the reading public because of his searing criticism of greed and corruption.
Eventually Nini’s bombastic claims landed him in trouble. In April 2008 he alleged in a column that a public prosecutor in the town of Ksar el Kebir had attended a “gay wedding” held in the house of a trafficker. There was never a gay wedding, and the town’s four public prosecutors successfully sued him for libel. The $800,000 fine imposed on him was the largest libel judgment ever awarded in the country. Nini’s reply? This was “judicial terrorism.” Like many journalists in Morocco, he soon became a frequent visitor of police stations and courtrooms, and has several libel lawsuits still pending against him. But despite the onerous fines, Nini somehow managed to hold onto his newspaper.
Earlier this year he got in trouble again when he criticized Morocco’s intelligence service, the redoubtable Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, saying it should be put under parliamentary oversight. The government’s reaction was swift: Nini was charged with “denigrating judicial rulings” and “compromising the security and safety of the homeland and citizens.” On June 9, he was convicted and sentenced to prison.
The turn of events held plenty of irony. Nini, often the recipient of score-settling government leaks, ended up jailed by the same government whose agenda he sometimes served. And the people who rose to his defense—human-rights activists and journalists—were the same people he often attacked in his writings.
Nini’s incarceration poses a larger problem for Morocco, however. Early last spring the king responded to the widespread demands for change by swiftly announcing constitutional reforms he said would promote separation of powers and the rule of law. But Nini was convicted under the penal code, not under the press code. A one-year jail sentence for an article is the sort of detail that messes up the smooth democratic façade Morocco wants to present to the rest of the world.